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CREATURES OF HABIT: PREDICTIONS ABOUT 
DELAWARE’S FUTURE TREATMENT OF 
DISCLOSURE ONLY SETTLEMENTS AND WHAT 
IT MEANS FOR PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEYS 
SEEKING A PAY DAY 
Abstract: Scholars agree that in order for states to either obtain or maintain the 
business of corporate merger litigation, they must engage in competition with 
one another. Delaware has participated in this competition in the past to maintain 
its position as the country’s leading forum for corporate merger litigation. One of 
the most prominent aspects of this type of litigation is the “disclosure only set-
tlement.” In the 2016 case In re Trulia, the Delaware Court of Chancery broke 
from a well-established precedent of approving disclosure only settlements and 
indicated it would be applying a heightened level of scrutiny to them. As a result 
of this heightened standard, it is likely that plaintiffs’ attorneys will seek out oth-
er forums that do not apply such a level of scrutiny to disclosure only settle-
ments. If Delaware wishes to maintain its status as the leading forum for corpo-
rate litigation, it will need to employ new strategies. To this end, Delaware has 
suggested that plaintiffs use something known as the “mootness dismissal scenar-
io” to circumvent the heightened scrutiny that comes with this common type of 
settlements. This Note hypothesizes that Delaware will continue to promote the 
mootness dismissal scenario in an attempt to remain competitive. It will be left to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to respond by either continuing to file suit in Delaware or 
testing the waters in what may be friendlier jurisdictions. 
INTRODUCTION 
In July of 2014, Trulia, Inc. and Zillow, Inc. announced a proposed mer-
ger of their companies.1 The two corporations delivered similar services, 
providing information on properties available for sale or rent to customers.2 In 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 888 (Del. Ch. 2016) (discussing the 
proposed disclosure only settlement for the merger). The court in In re Trulia noted that a stockholder 
lawsuit is filed after the announcement of almost every merger of public corporations. Id. at 887. In 
2005, the percentage of mergers that resulted in a lawsuit was 39.3%. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven 
Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2013, at 2 tbl.A (Ohio State Pub. Law & Legal Theory, 
Working Paper Series No. 236, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2377001 
[https://perma.cc/7NCA-D7YH] (examining the state of merger litigation through data and analytics). 
By 2013, that number had grown to 97.5%. Id. 
 2 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 888. More specifically, the companies provide this information in an 
effort to make it easier on buyers/sellers of real estate to see what is currently available on the market. 
Id. 
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September of that same year, Christopher Shue, Matthew Sciabacucci, Chaile 
Steinberg, and Robert Collier, all Trulia stockholders, filed a lawsuit against 
both Zillow, Inc. and Zebra Holdco, Inc., which is now Zillow Group, Inc., 
alleging breach of fiduciary duty arising from this merger.3 After minimal dis-
covery, the parties arrived at a settlement agreement on November 19, 2014.4 
The agreement required that the defendants make additional disclosures in 
their filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), an agree-
ment commonly known as a “disclosure only settlement.”5 In exchange, the 
defendants obtained a broad release of claims from the plaintiffs.6 The only 
money to exchange hands in this settlement was from the defendants to the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.7 
Prior to 2016 and the landmark case In re Trulia, courts were inclined to 
approve these disclosure only settlements.8 The previous standard by which 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id. The plaintiffs allege a number of claims in the complaint, but discuss only the inadequate 
disclosures released by the corporation in advance of the proposed merger. Id. at 889. Two of the most 
prevalent fiduciary duties a board of directors owes to the corporation and its stockholders are the duty 
of care and the duty of loyalty. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083, 1101 (Del. 2001) 
(holding that duty of care claims cannot be successful when a corporation has adopted an exculpatory 
provision); Dweck v. Nasser, C.A. No. 1353-VCL, 2012 WL 161590, at *12 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2012) 
(holding that a defendant corporation breached its duty of loyalty by misusing corporate resources in 
order to derive a personal benefit). Duty of care claims involve a grossly negligent action, typically by 
a board of directors, which is then challenged by stockholders. See Malpiede, 780 A.3d at 1089 (dis-
cussing the plaintiffs’ duty of care claims). Duty of loyalty claims typically arise when an officer or 
director of the corporation abuses his/her power for personal benefit, rather than for the benefit of the 
corporation. See Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 19, 
1995) (discussing the essence of a duty of loyalty claim). 
 4 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 888–89. The discovery record contained less than three thousand pages 
of documents, a record which the court characterized as “sparse.” See id. at 893 (implying that the 
court felt the discovery efforts of the parties were inadequate to allow the court to truly evaluate the 
fairness of the proposed settlement agreement). 
 5 Id. at 889. The SEC is tasked with regulating the financial markets of the United States, which 
includes requiring corporations to make certain disclosures for various actions. What We Do, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html 
[https://perma.cc/8SXU-VWVQ]. An example of a typical disclosure that is made by defendants is 
providing information that supplements the proxy materials previously distributed ahead of a vote 
surrounding a proposed merger. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 891. 
 6 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 889–90. The final language of the release prohibited plaintiffs from 
later bringing “any claims arising under federal, state, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other law 
or rule” against the defendant. Id. at 890. As broad as this language is, it is actually scaled back from 
what the original language would have been. See id. (explaining the original language would have 
included a release from any “Unknown Claims” and “foreign” claims). 
 7 Id. at 887. 
 8 See In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484–VCG, 2015 WL 5458041, at 
*5–8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (approving a disclosure only settlement when the disclosures were “not 
of great importance”); In re Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Cos., Inc. S’holders Litig., Civil Action No. 13109, 
1996 WL 74214, at *4–6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 1996) (approving a disclosure only settlement when it was 
“meager” and afforded only a minor benefit to stockholders). 
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courts evaluated disclosure only settlements was a material standard.9 In re 
Trulia altered that standard and signified a shift in the legal landscape toward a 
stricter examination of disclosure only settlements.10 Courts across several ju-
risdictions seem to be much less likely to approve disclosure only settlements, 
due to the heightened level of scrutiny being applied to them.11 There are, 
however, some jurisdictions that have continued to view disclosure only set-
tlements more favorably post In re Trulia, despite adopting a higher level of 
scrutiny than the original material standard.12 
Scholars agree that states compete for corporate filings in various ways.13 
There is more recent evidence to support the position that states also compete 
with one another to obtain corporate litigation.14 In the past Delaware has re-
acted to a loss in litigation by increasing its competitiveness with other states, 
in an effort to maintain its hold on the market for corporate litigation.15 This 
Note suggests that Delaware will continue to adapt its strategies to maintain its 
competitive position as the leading forum for corporate litigation over other 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See In re Riverbed, 2015 WL 5458041, at *4 (determining whether an additional disclosure 
would have changed the information available to a stockholder in an effort to evaluate a disclosure 
only settlement under the material standard); In re Dr. Pepper, 1996 WL 74214, at *3 (applying the 
material standard to disclosure only settlements). The material standard was relatively easy to satisfy, 
as it required only that the disclosures be related to information that a stockholder would consider in 
deciding how to vote. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 10 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898. 
 11 See Farber v. Crestwood Midstream Partner L.P., 863 F.3d 410, 415–16 (5th Cir. 2017) (adopt-
ing the plainly material standard established by In re Trulia); In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 
832 F.3d 718, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2016) (following the plainly material standard in In re Trulia and 
rejecting a disclosure only settlement because it did not provide adequate consideration to plaintiffs); 
Bushansky v. Remy Int’l, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 742, 746 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (rejecting a disclosure only 
settlement because none of the supplemental disclosures were material to the plaintiffs); In re Trulia, 
129 A.3d at 898 (holding disclosure only settlements to a higher standard in order to receive judicial 
approval). The plainly material standard adopted by In re Trulia requires a much higher level of scru-
tiny than its predecessor, the material standard. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898. 
 12 See Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 557, 565, 572–73 (App. Div. 2017) 
(mentioning In re Trulia while going on to approve a disclosure only settlement and adopting a more 
lenient standard than the plainly material one); City Trading Fund v. Nye, 72 N.Y.S.3d 371, 371 (Sup. 
Ct. 2018) (discussing In re Trulia and noting that New York’s standard for evaluating disclosure only 
settlements is “more lenient” than Delaware’s standard). 
 13 See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 472 (2015) (discussing the commonly accepted 
principle that there is state competition for initial public offering filings); Robert Daines, The Incorpo-
ration Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1566, 1572 (2002) (providing numerical data 
to show that Delaware is dominating the competition between states for corporation filings). 
 14 See Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 472 (discussing how states compete for litigation by 
altering their dismissal rates of cases or increasing attorney’s fees). 
 15 See id. at 496–97 (providing evidence to show that Delaware has previously reacted to a loss in 
litigation by increasing its efforts to compete with other states). 
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states that have declined to apply a similar heightened scrutiny to disclosure 
only settlements.16 
Part I of this Note begins with a discussion of the mechanics and policy 
behind the requirement for judicial approval of class action settlements.17 It 
also explains the technical aspects of disclosure only settlements, and exam-
ines how the courts traditionally treated them.18 Part II highlights the evolution 
of the legal landscape surrounding the approval of disclosure only settlements 
and introduces the mootness dismissal scenario.19 Part III discusses the moti-
vating factors behind class action litigation and how states, including Dela-
ware, have previously competed for litigation.20 Part IV concludes that based 
on its previous behavior, Delaware courts will use the mootness dismissal sce-
nario as its core mechanism for competing with other states to maintain corpo-
rate litigation, and that Delaware’s primacy will thus be determine by plain-
tiffs’ lawyers.21 
I. JUDICIAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS  
AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRIOR LEGAL TREATMENT  
OF DISCLOSURE ONLY SETTLEMENTS 
The settlement of a class action lawsuit, a common outcome in the realm 
of corporate law, requires judicial approval.22 This often takes the form of a 
disclosure only settlement.23 Section A of this Part explains the policy behind 
the judicial approval requirement of class action settlements.24 Section B goes 
on to further explicate the disclosure only settlement, and how courts have 
generally treated them in the past.25 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See Gordon, 46 N.Y.S.3d at 565 (showing New York is likely to continue approving disclosure 
only settlements); City Trading Fund, 72 N.Y.S.3d at 371 (stating that New York’s standard is easier 
to meet than Delaware’s); Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 496 (noting that Delaware has previous-
ly altered its habits when facing a loss in corporate litigation in an effort to maintain it). 
 17 See infra notes 26–48 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 49–70 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 71–139 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 140–173 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 174–204 and accompanying text. 
 22 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (governing rule on class actions in federal law); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 
(governing rule on class actions in Delaware state law); In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 887 (discussing the 
frequency with which class action lawsuits occur in the corporate realm). 
 23 See Cain & Solomon, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing the rate of disclosure only settlements in 
Delaware). 
 24 See infra notes 26–48 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 49–70 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Requirement of Judicial Approval of Class Action Settlements 
A common vehicle for challenging actions taken by a corporation is the 
class action lawsuit.26 A class action lawsuit is one brought on behalf of a group 
of people who all face a similar harm based upon the action of the defendant.27 
According to Delaware Chancery Court Rules, which mirror the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, any settlement of a class action lawsuit must be reviewed and 
approved by a judge in order for it to be valid.28 A judge must find that the set-
tlement is “reasonable and intrinsically fair.”29 This approval is necessary be-
cause class action settlements have the potential to bind all members of the class 
to their terms, and courts have an intrinsic mandate to ensure equitable resolu-
tions, especially regarding large classes and binding settlements.30 
In examining the fairness of a proposed settlement, the court must con-
duct a thorough investigation into the legal claims presented, assess the likeli-
hood of success, and consider any appropriate defenses.31 This investigation 
includes a balancing of the possible outcomes and interests of the plaintiffs and 
defendants.32 In doing so, the court must look at the “give” and “get” and en-
                                                                                                                           
 26 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 887 (stating that almost all public corporation acquisition is chal-
lenged by a class action suit); C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Jurisdictional Effects in M&A Litigation, 11 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 132, 133 (2014) (noting that nearly 86% of M&A lawsuits are class ac-
tions). It is a well-established principle that courts generally prefer to have legal disputes settled prior 
to trial, to save time and avoid unnecessary court costs. Rome v. Archer, 197 A.2d 49, 53 (Del. Ch. 
1964). 
 27 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (governing rule on class actions in federal law). There are several pre-
requisites for a class action lawsuit, including (1) that it be impractical to join all members in the suit; 
(2) the class shares either common questions of law or fact; (3) the representatives of the class have 
the same claims or defenses as the other members; and the representatives of the class will protect the 
class’s interests. Id. 
 28 Id.; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. Regarding matters of corporate law, states have taken the driver’s 
seat and federal law has not intervened. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflec-
tions Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663 (1974) (declaring that state law has “always been su-
preme” on corporate matters and federal law involvement is “limited”). As such, this Note will focus 
its analysis on state law, specifically Delaware, as it is the leadings state on corporate matters. See id. 
at 664 (noting that in 1913, Delaware took over from New Jersey as the leading state for corporate 
matters and has not relinquished its position since). 
 29 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 891, 898 (discussing the underlying rationale behind the plainly 
material standard being applied to disclosure only settlements). The standard adopted in federal court 
is that a settlement must be fair, adequate, and reasonable. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. The plainly material 
standard imposes a heightened level of scrutiny on disclosure only settlements. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d 
at 898. 
 30 See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 58–9 (Del. 1991) (reasoning that because the interests of all 
shareholders must be considered and advanced, judicial approval of a class action settlement that 
would be binding on the shareholders is necessary); Rome, 197 A.2d at 53 (explaining the important 
role the judiciary plays in approving a class action settlement). 
 31 Rome, 197 A.2d at 53. 
 32 See In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1043 (Del. Ch. 2015) 
(discussing the balancing of interests that the court must do when considering the approval of a set-
tlement). 
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sure there is an appropriate balance between the two.33 The “give” refers to the 
benefit that a defendant corporation receives by the lawsuit being dropped and 
a release of claims being signed by the plaintiffs.34 The “get” refers to the ben-
efit the plaintiff class members receive in exchange for granting the defendant 
corporation that relief.35 In a disclosure only settlement, that benefit is not 
monetary, but rather involves the release of supplemental information about 
the defendant corporation.36 When both parties agree to a settlement, the dy-
namics of the lawsuit shift, which necessitates judicial examination of the 
terms of the settlement.37 
A key aspect of a lawsuit is its adversarial nature.38 When plaintiffs and 
defendants reach a settlement agreement, this adversarial element is removed 
and the sole goal of both parties is to ensure that the settlement receives judi-
cial approval.39 The defendants are motivated by the nearing end of the lawsuit 
against them and limiting their financial liability, whereas the plaintiffs’ attor-
neys are motivated by the opportunity to receive attorney’s fees.40 The stock-
                                                                                                                           
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See id. (explaining the importance of ensuring that the interests of the class members must be 
balanced against a corporation’s desire for settlement). 
 36 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 891 n.15 (explaining what the court means when it uses the term 
disclosure only settlement). This supplemental information often comes in a Form 8-K filed with the 
SEC. Id. at 887–89. A Form 8-K is what a corporation files with the SEC to satisfy its filing obliga-
tions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. What We Do, supra note 5. 
 37 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 893 (explaining in detail the various issues surrounding judicial 
approval of a disclosure only settlement). 
 38 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (discussing the importance of upholding 
the “vitality of the adversarial process” (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)); Kossol v. Ashton Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. 14, 1993, 1994 WL 10861, at *3 
(Del. Jan. 6, 1994) (overturning a trial court decision because the plaintiff did not have a chance to 
utilize the adversarial process of litigation); Anderson v. Frederick Ford Mercury, Inc., C.A. No. 
K10C-06-023, 2011 WL 1887106, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2011) (denying a motion to dismiss 
to ensure that the parties have the opportunity to have their claims litigated through the adversarial 
process). 
 39 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 893. 
 40 See id. at 891–92 (discussing generally the benefits each party receives in a disclosure only 
settlement). In most cases, the American legal fee system is one in which each party is responsible for 
paying its own attorneys. See Horsey v. Horsey & Sons, Inc., Civil Action No. 8972-VCG, 2016 WL 
1274021, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 2016) (providing an example of the American legal fee system). 
This is different from the English legal fee system, in which the losing party is often required to pay 
the winning party’s legal fees. See Mark Lebovitch & Jeroen van Kwawegen, Of Babies and Bath-
water: Deterring Frivolous Stockholder Suits Without Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate 
Claims, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 517 (2016) (comparing briefly the English and American legal fee 
systems). In the settlement of class action lawsuits, however, courts have held that the defendant cor-
poration can be responsible for paying the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees. See Waterside Partners v. C. 
Brewer & Co., 739 A.2d 768, 769–70 (Del. 1999) (explaining that attorney’s fees can be shifted to 
defendants when the benefit obtained goes to a class); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Baron, 413 
A.2d 876, 878 (Del. 1980) (discussing that if the action taken by defendants during a proposed settle-
ment stems from the actions of the plaintiffs, then the defendants may be responsible for attorney’s 
2019] Disclosure Only Settlements 599 
holder plaintiffs, however, receive no monetary compensation and the only 
benefit they receive is that which they derive from the additional infor-
mation.41 Without the adversarial element present in a settlement, the judge 
must intervene to assess its intrinsic fairness.42 When plaintiffs and defendants 
share the same interest of obtaining settlement approval, they will no longer 
provide arguments against the settlement, or the attorney’s fees accompanying 
it, and it is left to the court to become a pseudo-advocate to ensure the settle-
ment is truly in the best interests of all parties.43 
There is an even greater problem inherent to merger litigation settlements 
than their non-adversarial nature—the expedited nature of proceedings.44 Be-
cause settlements related to a proposed merger or acquisition are often reached 
quickly in order to allow the deal to go through, discovery tends to be mini-
mal.45 One example of a typical record for a case involving a disclosure only 
settlement included no motions being decided, the production of fewer than 
three thousand documents, and only one deposition taken prior to the settle-
ment agreement being reached.46 This provides a unique challenge to the 
judge, who must rule on the intrinsic fairness of deal without having a thor-
                                                                                                                           
fees). Attorney’s fees in Delaware are calculated using a combination of the Sugarland factors: “(1) 
the benefit achieved in the action; (2) the contingent nature of the undertaking; (3) the difficulty of the 
litigation and the efforts of counsel; (4) the quality of the work performed; and (5) the standing and 
ability of counsel.” Franklin Balance Sheet Inv. Fund v. Crowley, No. Civ.A. 888-VCP, 2007 WL 
2495018, at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2007) (citing Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 
149–50 (Del. 1980)). 
 41 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 891–92 (indicating that plaintiffs receive only the benefit of the 
additional information). The court in In re Trulia went on to say that often times this type of litigation 
is useless to the stockholder plaintiffs and only provides a true benefit to the plaintiffs’ attorneys. See 
id. (stating that it is “relatively infrequent” that this type of litigation provides any meaningful benefit 
to stockholder plaintiffs). 
 42 See Ginsburg v. Phila. Stock Exch., Inc., Civil Action No. 2202-CC, 2007 WL 2982238, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2007) (noting that once a settlement has been reached, former adversaries become 
one with a united interest in obtaining judicial approval). 
 43 See id. at *1 (explaining that once adversarial parties prior to a settlement join forces to achieve 
judicial approval of their proposed settlement offer); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 
A.2d 959, 961 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting that the non-adversarial nature of this stage requires the court 
to make its own efforts in evaluating the discovery record, something that is inherently less reliable 
than any judicial finding that is made after the trial process). 
 44 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 893 (providing an example of the speedy timeline disclosure only 
settlements typically have). The difficulty with the expedited timeline of proceedings is that it limits 
the discovery record and, as such the court has less information to examine when deciding whether to 
approve a settlement. Id. 
 45 Id. In 2008 the average civil lawsuit involving major companies would include nearly five 
million pages of documents during discovery. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 
GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 
1, 3 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/litigation_cost_survey_of_major_companies
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZMC9-WQR3]. For contrast, the discovery record the court was asked to 
review during In re Trulia involved less than three thousand pages. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 893. 
 46 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 893. 
600 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:593 
ough record on the matter.47 As a result, judges often find themselves becom-
ing finders of fact—a position that is generally reserved for a jury.48 
B. Technical Aspects of Disclosure Only Settlements  
and the Prior Treatment of Them 
Disclosure only settlements have become remarkably popular and effec-
tive in resolving corporate lawsuits.49 In a disclosure only settlement, plaintiffs 
agree to drop a lawsuit against the defendant corporation in exchange for the 
release of further information from the defendant.50 This additional infor-
mation can be anything from more information about the technical details sur-
rounding a merger, to information supplementing the materials distributed 
ahead of a stockholder vote for a specific transaction.51 Often times, these dis-
closure only settlements include a broad release of claims against the defend-
ant—including claims that may not be specifically mentioned in the lawsuit.52 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Id. at 894. 
 48 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (including explicitly the right to a jury trial). The founders includ-
ed in the Bill of Rights the right to a jury trial in civil cases. Id. In doing so, they established the jury, 
and not the judge, as the primary fact finder in such trials. Id. 
 49 See In re Walgreen Co., 832 F.3d at 725 (discussing further In re Trulia and disclosure only 
settlements); Bushansky, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 746 (denying a proposed disclosure only settlement be-
cause it fails the In re Trulia plainly material standard). From 2005 to 2013, the percentage of all 
Delaware settlements with resolutions involving disclosures rose from 46.4% to 78.6%. See Cain & 
Solomon, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.C (discussing the rise in disclosure only settlements in Delaware). 
 50 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 891 n.15. This Note has discussed how the actual stockholder plain-
tiffs receive little to no benefit from disclosure only settlements. See supra note 41 and accompanying 
text. The underlying theory about why these types of settlements are beneficial to plaintiffs is that it 
may provide further information that might influence a stockholders vote on a proposed transaction. 
See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 887 (explaining that the fundamental theory behind disclosure only set-
tlements is to better inform stockholders in advance of a transaction vote). Ultimately, scholars have 
found that this does not seem to be the true motivating factor behind these lawsuits and their accom-
panying settlements. See Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 480 (discussing that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
must file a high volume of lawsuits in order to maintain their business); John C. Coffee, Jr., Under-
standing the Plaintiffs’ Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of 
Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677 (1986) (explaining that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys operate under an assumption that only a few of their cases will be successful, so 
they must file numerous lawsuits in order to maintain their business). Instead, they have found that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are the true lifeblood of lawsuits challenging merger transactions and their prima-
ry motivation is obtaining attorney’s fees. See Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then 
Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 
1851–52 (2004) (finding that stockholder litigation is propelled by lawyers and not for the stockhold-
ers’ benefit). 
 51 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 891 n.15. 
 52 See In re Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 725 (discussing that courts have traditionally granted broad 
releases to corporations with the approval of disclosure only settlements); In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 
894 (contending that because of the routine approval of disclosure only settlements and the broad 
releases that often accompany it, there has been an increase in litigation filed). The initial release that 
both parties agreed to was characterized by the court as “extremely broad” and even included any 
claims that if a plaintiff had known about would have prevented said plaintiff from agreeing to the 
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In a disclosure only settlement, the plaintiffs do not receive any money—
instead the only actors who receive money are the plaintiffs’ attorneys.53 This 
idea was famously encapsulated in Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 
when the Supreme Court of Delaware reasoned that economically rational de-
fendants will settle stockholder litigation claims for a “peppercorn and a fee.”54 
As it pertains to disclosure only settlements, the peppercorn is the minimal 
supplemental disclosure made by the defendants that effectively leads to the 
settlement, and the fee is the money that the plaintiffs’ attorneys receive.55 
Until recently, courts in Delaware would routinely approve disclosure on-
ly settlements.56 In fact, courts seemed to go to great lengths to approve such 
settlements by including qualifying language such as “meager” and “some” to 
the terms settlement and benefit in their written opinions.57 The language im-
plies that so long as there is “some” benefit from the disclosures to plaintiffs, 
no matter how small, the court will approve the settlement.58 For example, the 
court in In re Dr. Pepper/Seven Up alluded to the fact that if parties came to a 
settlement agreement it would be approved, as long as there was some benefit 
conferred to the plaintiffs, no matter how small.59 A more recent case, In re 
Riverbed, resulted in judicial approval of a disclosure only settlement, despite 
the fact that the record showed the additional disclosures made by the defend-
ants made no impact on stockholders.60 
                                                                                                                           
settlement. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 889. A full analysis of this ostensibly inequitable outcome is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
 53 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 887. 
 54 Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 38 (Del. 1996). 
 55 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 891–92 (discussing the benefits various parties in a disclosure 
only settlement receive). 
 56 See In re Riverbed, 2015 WL 5458041, at *8 (approving a disclosure only settlement even 
when the disclosures were of little or no importance to stockholders); In re Dr. Pepper, 1996 WL 
74214, at *4, *6 (Del. Ch. 1996) (approving a disclosure only settlement that only had a meager bene-
fit to stockholders). 
 57 In re Dr. Pepper, 1996 WL 74214, at *4. The court indicated that even if the disclosures are of 
minimal benefit to a plaintiff, the settlement will be approved. See id. (explaining the relatively low 
standard disclosure only settlements previously had to meet). In doing so, the court seems to be put-
ting a great deal of emphasis on the judicial preference of settlements instead of trials. See id. (approv-
ing a disclosure only settlement); Rome, 197 A.2d at 53 (discussing the overall preference of the 
courts to have cases resolved by voluntary settlement). 
 58 See In re Dr. Pepper, 1996 WL 74214, at *4 (discussing the approval of a disclosure only set-
tlement that only provided a minimal benefit to plaintiffs). 
 59 Id. This case arose from a holding company’s offer to purchase the outstanding shares in order 
to acquire Dr. Pepper/Seven Up. Id. 
 60 See In re Riverbed, 2015 WL 5458041, at *5 (noting “99.48% [of shares] voted in favor of the 
Merger despite the disclosures”). The judge went on to approve the disclosure only settlement, while 
remarking that “the disclosure here was not of great importance.” Id. More specifically, the disclo-
sures offered seemed to imply that there was an ongoing relationship between the parties and the “in-
dependent” assessor that provided the price that was to be used in the transaction. See id. (discussing 
the ongoing relationships between the defendants and Goldman Sachs). The court also briefly men-
tioned tax disclosures that were made to make the transaction more attractive to potential voters, 
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Until In re Trulia, courts evaluated the supplemental disclosures under a 
material standard.61 As long as the supplemental disclosures provided addi-
tional information about a “material misrepresentation or omission,” they 
would be approved.62 The U.S. Supreme Court considers an omitted fact to be 
material if there is a “substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”63 The Supreme Court 
also emphasized that an omitted fact is material if it would “significantly alter 
the total mix of information made available.”64 This material standard provides 
a great deal of leeway to the courts because it does not require that the supple-
mental disclosures would have changed the vote of any shareholder, but simply 
that the information would be a consideration in deciding how to vote.65 
As a result of the lenient material standard of settlement approval, a num-
ber of lawsuits were filed against corporations, particularly following the an-
nouncement of a public merger or acquisition.66 Plaintiffs’ attorneys saw the 
opportunity to make a business out of filing lawsuits and having them quickly 
settled in exchange for minimal information and a small fee provided by the 
defendants.67 Defendants were inclined to settle in order to allow their deals to 
continue uninterrupted, and furthermore would frequently use the opportunity 
obtain a broad release of claims against them, even potential future claims that 
                                                                                                                           
which is contrary to the idea that these disclosures are supposed to inform stockholders of arguments 
against the act the corporation wants them to take. See id. (noting the tax disclosures were of minimal 
benefit to stockholders because they only served to make the merger “more attractive to the Class”). 
 61 See id. at *4 (applying the material standard to a disclosure only settlement before ultimately 
approving it); In re Dr. Pepper, 1996 WL 74214, at *3 (using the material standard and approving a 
disclosure only settlement). 
 62 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898 (overhauling the standard by which courts consider approval 
of a disclosure only settlement); In re Riverbed, 2015 WL 5458041, at *4 (approving a disclosure only 
settlement under the material standard); In re Dr. Pepper, 1996 WL 74214, at *3 (allowing a disclo-
sure only settlement because the supplemental disclosures were material). 
 63 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (resolving any uncertainty 
that previously existed about what the standard of materiality meant for disclosures made by a corpo-
ration). Delaware has adopted this standard for materiality explicitly in its jurisprudence. See Rosen-
blatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (adopting the standard for materiality estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc.). 
 64 TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449. 
 65 See id. (discussing broadly the standard of materiality and its relation to corporate disclosures). 
 66 See In re Resorts Int’l S’holders Litig. Appeals, 570 A.2d 259, 261 (Del. 1990) (resolving a 
lawsuit that was filed shortly after the announcement of an attempted corporate takeover); In re Riv-
erbed, 2015 WL 5458041, at *4 (approving a disclosure only settlement for a lawsuit filed shortly 
after a merger announcement); In re Dr. Pepper, 1996 WL 74214, at *3 (using the materiality stand-
ard to approve a disclosure only settlement for a lawsuit filed promptly after an announced merger). 
 67 See Solomon, 672 A.2d at 38 (stating that plaintiff stockholders can often file frivolous class 
action lawsuits, because a loose reading of Chancery Rule 23.1 allows them to do so). Chancery Rule 
23.1 governs what a plaintiff must include in a complaint, and if there is a stricter interpretation of this 
rule, it would likely result in less litigation overall. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. This could result in fewer 
disclosure only settlements. See Solomon, 672 A.2d at 38 (alluding to the idea that a stricter reading of 
Rule 23.1 and other rules would result in fewer frivolous lawsuits). 
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were unknown to plaintiffs arising from the same facts.68 In exchange, defend-
ant corporations merely had to make minimal disclosures to the public, many 
of which related to technical details about a deal that would likely not influ-
ence any shareholder’s vote on the matter.69 Plaintiffs and defendants alike 
became accustomed to this legal framework and learned to exist in it.70 
II. THE SHIFTING LEGAL LANDSCAPE REGARDING DISCLOSURE ONLY 
SETTLEMENTS: THE NEW PLAINLY MATERIAL STANDARD 
Delaware’s jurisprudence surrounding disclosure only settlements changed 
dramatically with the Chancery Court’s decision in 2016, In re Trulia.71 With its 
decision, the court also mentioned possible alternative routes to the traditional 
disclosure only settlement that plaintiffs and defendants might take.72 Section A 
of this Part focuses on In re Trulia and how it changed Delaware’s law surround-
ing disclosure only settlements.73 Section B of this Part introduces one alterna-
tive approach, the mootness dismissal scenario, and highlights the differences 
between mootness dismissals and disclosure only settlements.74 
A. In re Trulia’s Effect on Disclosure Only Settlements 
In re Trulia marks a monumental shift in Delaware’s treatment of disclo-
sure only settlements.75 The case involved a merger agreement between Trulia 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Solomon, 672 A.2d at 38; In re Riverbed, 2015 WL 5458041, at *4; In re Dr. Pepper, 1996 WL 
74214, at *3. 
 69 See In re Dr. Pepper, 1996 WL 74214, at *4 (classifying the benefit of the disclosures as “ther-
apeutic in nature” and approving the settlement only under the material standard). 
 70 See Cain & Solomon, supra note 1, at 6 (indicating a rise in plaintiffs and defendants agreeing 
to disclosure only settlements in Delaware). Cain and Solomon found that from 2005 to 2013, the 
overall percentage of merger announcements that resulted in litigation rose from 39.3% to 97.5%. Id. 
at 2 tbl.A. 
 71 See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016) (discussing that 
prior to this case, disclosure only settlements were evaluated under a standard of materiality and hold-
ing that from now on they will be under the heightened scrutiny of a plainly material standard). Alt-
hough this case does not establish a binding precedent on other courts, most corporations are filed in 
Delaware and other courts often look to Delaware for guidance when it comes to matters of corporate 
law. See In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying the plain-
ly material standard from In re Trulia and subsequently binding the Seventh Circuit to this precedent); 
Daines, supra note 13, at 1566, 1572 (finding that approximately 50% of Fortune 500 corporations 
incorporate in Delaware). Therefore, the impact of this decision will almost certainly reach beyond the 
borders of Delaware and influence other courts dealing with the issue of disclosure only settlements. 
See In re Walgreen Co., 832 F.3d at 725 (adopting, applying, and following the precedent established 
in In re Trulia). 
 72 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 896–97 (highlighting the mootness dismissal scenario). 
 73 See infra notes 75–115 and accompanying text. 
 74 See infra notes 116–139 and accompanying text. 
 75 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898 (describing the changing landscape in Delaware regarding its 
treatment of disclosure only settlements). 
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Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Zillow Inc., a Washington corporation.76 
Shortly after the companies announced the agreement, several stockholders 
filed class action lawsuits.77 They claimed that the defendants breached their 
fiduciary duties by failing to provide enough information to stockholders 
ahead of the scheduled vote on the proposed merger.78 Shortly after the indi-
vidual plaintiffs filed their respective lawsuits, the court consolidated them into 
one action, appointed lead counsel, and discovery began.79 The discovery in 
this case was modest, amounting to around three thousand pages of documents 
and three depositions.80 After the approximately four-month discovery period, 
the parties agreed to a disclosure only settlement, and sought judicial approv-
al.81 
In the past, judges routinely approved these disclosure only settlements, 
often with minimal discussion.82 The In re Trulia court abandoned its material 
standard and instead adopted a stricter “plainly material” standard.83 The court 
indicated that going forward, disclosure only settlements would be more heavi-
ly scrutinized.84 By doing so, the court implied that the old standard was inef-
fective and resulted in unfavorable settlements for plaintiffs.85 The new stand-
ard would require that any supplemental disclosures must address “plainly ma-
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id. at 888. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. The plaintiffs in In re Trulia also allege a number of other fiduciary duty violations by the 
defendants; however, they only provided evidence and discussion of the lack of information/disclosures 
by the defendants. Id. at 889. See supra note 3 for a more complete description of fiduciary duties. 
 79 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 888. 
 80 Id. at 893. A study conducted on the general costs of litigation found that in 2008, the average 
number of pages produced in discovery for lawsuits that went to trial involving major Fortune 500 
companies totaled nearly five million. See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 
GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 45, at 15–16 (discussing the numerical 
costs of litigation and the burden this imposes on litigants). In the same year, the study found that 
these companies spent a mean value of $621,880 on discovery costs. Id. at 15. These numbers provide 
some context to the typical discovery record in civil litigation cases and show the contrast between 
this and the sparse discovery record found in disclosure only settlements. See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 
893 (showing that fewer than three thousand pages of documents were produced in the discovery 
process for this case); LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER 
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 45, at 15–16 (providing data on the typical amount of discov-
ery taken in Fortune 500 litigation that goes to trial). 
 81 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d. at 889–90. 
 82 See In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 5458041, 
at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (including minimal discussion before granting a settlement); In re Dr. 
Pepper/Seven Up Cos., Inc. S’holders Litig., 1996 WL 74214, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 1996) (approv-
ing a settlement after acknowledging that the disclosures are meager and provide a minimal, mostly 
therapeutic, benefit). 
 83 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898 (discussing in detail the shift in precedent towards a higher 
level of scrutiny for disclosure only settlements). 
 84 See id. (warning practitioners that Delaware courts are likely to look unfavorably upon disclo-
sure only settlements in the future). 
 85 See id. (referring to the disclosure only settlement method of resolving merger litigation as 
“historically trodden but suboptimal”). 
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terial” omitted facts to receive judicial approval.86 In order to eliminate any 
possible confusion about the new approach it was taking, the court went one 
step further and indicated that if it were a close call as to whether or not a sup-
plemental disclosure satisfied this plainly material standard, then the settle-
ment would not be approved.87 Under this more stringent standard, the court 
examined the disclosures made by the defendants, found that they were not 
plainly material, and ultimately denied the settlement.88 
The court in In re Trulia briefly discussed the possible effects of this “en-
hanced judicial scrutiny” on disclosure only settlements.89 It noted the possi-
bility that the increased likelihood of rejection of such settlements in Delaware 
might lead plaintiffs to file lawsuits against Delaware corporations in other 
jurisdictions.90 In response, the court clarified that corporations maintain au-
thority to adopt forum selection bylaws limiting the jurisdiction of any suit 
against it to Delaware.91 The court in In re Trulia realized that it was marking a 
shift in the legal landscape and it appealed to other jurisdictions to follow its 
approach of heightened scrutiny.92 
Following In re Trulia, lawyers and scholars alike wondered whether oth-
er jurisdictions would follow the plainly material approach, or whether they 
would continue to approve disclosure only settlements with minimal scrutiny.93 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. (“In using the term ‘plainly material,’ I mean that it should not be a close call that the 
supplemental information is material as that term is defined under Delaware law.”). The court appears 
to be going to great lengths to make it clear that it does not favor disclosure only settlements going 
forward. See id. (including language that implies that disclosure only settlements are not preferable to 
this court). 
 88 Id. at 907. 
 89 See id at 899 (suggesting that this decision may cause plaintiffs’ attorneys to engage in forum 
shopping to move the litigation, and request that other jurisdictions follow this precedent). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. The authority for a corporation to unilaterally adopt a forum selection bylaw was first estab-
lished in Delaware in 2013. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 938–
39 (Del. Ch. 2013). A forum selection bylaw requires that certain lawsuits and issues be litigated in 
the forum established by the corporation in its bylaws. Id. at 937–38. 
 92 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 899 (urging other courts to follow a similar line of thinking). The 
court explicitly says in the section regarding the plainly material standard, “We hope and trust that our 
sister courts will reach the same conclusion if confronted with the issue.” Id.  
 93 See Richard A. Barkasy & Daniel M. Pereira, Will Merger-Challenge Suits Shift to New York 
After Gordon v. Verizon?, 27 WESTLAW J. MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, no. 11, May 15, 2017, at *1, 
*1 (discussing the possibility that New York may not follow In re Trulia); Todd A. Holleman & Rob-
ert E. Murkowski, The Future of Disclosure-Only Merger and Acquisition Class Action Settlements in 
Michigan, MICH. B.J. Aug. 2017, at 16, 17 (discussing the possible effects of In re Trulia on Michi-
gan); Abigail Pickering Bomba et al., Delaware’s Effort to Reduce Wasteful M&A Litigation—Should 
Companies Adopt Delaware Forum Selection Bylaws After Trulia?, FRIED FRANK M&A BRIEFING 
(Fried Frank, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 9, 2016, at 1, 2–3, https://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/
Publications/Final%20-2-9-2016-MA%20Briefing-Trulia.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCS9-XYNJ] (imply-
ing that because some jurisdictions may not follow In re Trulia that corporations might consider 
adopting forum selection bylaws in order to either avoid or avail themselves of the holding). 
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The well-known law firm Fried Frank, LLP released a briefing a few weeks 
after the decision stating that it was uncertain how other jurisdictions would 
react, and advised its corporate clients to wait and see before taking action.94 
Legal scholars wrote articles discussing In re Trulia and hypothesizing what it 
would mean for the broader, countrywide treatment of disclosure only settle-
ments.95 
In August of 2016, eight months after In re Trulia, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit released an opinion adopting a heightened 
level of scrutiny for disclosure only settlements.96 This case, In re Walgreen 
Co. Stockholder Litigation, followed a similar fact pattern to In re Trulia.97 
The Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion as the Delaware Chancery 
Court and refused to approve the disclosure only settlement.98 Following the 
Seventh Circuit’s adoption of In re Trulia, several lower courts have applied 
this stricter analysis of the “give” and “get” of a disclosure only settlement and 
thus have refused to approve such settlements when the disclosures do not ad-
dress a plainly material omitted fact.99 
Although it is a higher standard, the plainly material standard laid out in 
In re Trulia and adopted by other jurisdictions does not necessitate that all dis-
                                                                                                                           
 94 Bomba et al., supra note 93, at 4–5 (instructing corporate clients to wait and see how various 
jurisdictions will react to In re Trulia before making any decisions about how to proceed). 
 95 See Barkasy & Pereira, supra note 93, at *1 (discussing the broader effects of In re Trulia on 
New York and indicating that New York might not take the same attitude towards disclosure only 
settlements as Delaware); Holleman & Murkowski, supra note 93, at 17 (discussing the possible reach 
of In re Trulia to Michigan and discussing how the precedent established would impact Michigan’s 
treatment of disclosure only settlements). 
 96 See In re Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 725–26 (formally adopting the plainly material standard estab-
lished in the Seventh Circuit by In re Trulia). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
has also adopted the plainly material standard. See Farber v. Crestwood Midstream Partners L.P., 863 
F.3d 410, 415–16 (5th Cir. 2017) (adopting the plainly material standard established by In re Trulia). 
 97 In re Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 725–26. The case also involved a merger announcement of two 
corporations and a shareholder lawsuit to challenge it. Id. at 721–22. Like In re Trulia, it included 
relatively limited discovery, a disclosure only settlement being agreed to, and court approval being 
sought. Id. 
 98 See id. at 725–26 (explicitly naming In re Trulia and announcing that the Seventh Circuit was 
going to follow the precedent established and use the plainly material standard for evaluating disclo-
sure only settlements). In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit explicitly named In re Trulia and its plainly 
material standard, while stating that it would adopt this more stringent standard going forward. Id. at 
725. 
 99 See Bushansky v. Remy Int’l, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 742, 754 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (applying the 
standard explained in Trulia and adopted by the seventh circuit in Walgreen); Gordon v. Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 557, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (mentioning In re Trulia while going on to 
approve a disclosure only settlement and adopting a less strict interpretation of the plainly material 
standard); In re Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 16-CVS-3669, 2018 WL 264537, 
at *5–6 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2018) (discussing In re Trulia and the plainly material standard while 
still approving a disclosure only settlement). 
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closure only settlements be rejected.100 On January 2, 2018, a North Carolina 
court approved a disclosure only settlement while applying the plainly material 
standard espoused in In re Trulia.101 The court emphasized that although the 
plainly material standard calls for a more in-depth analysis into disclosure only 
settlements, it does not necessitate that the settlement be rejected per se.102 
While pointing out this nuance that could limit In re Trulia, the court found that 
the disclosures made by the defendant successfully addressed a plainly material 
omitted fact or misrepresentation, and as such, felt it appropriate to approve of 
the settlement.103 More specifically, the additional disclosures the defendant 
made contained financial information used to value the company for sale.104 
Even the Delaware Chancery Court has displayed a willingness to ap-
prove disclosure only settlements.105 In re BTU was decided post In re Trulia, 
and involved a stockholder class action challenge to a proposed merger.106 
Thus, it appears that defendants and plaintiffs seeking to resolve merger dis-
putes may still use disclosure only settlements as a means to do so—despite 
their negative treatment in In re Trulia.107 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See In re BTU Int’l, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10310-CB, 2016 WL 680252, at *2–3 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 18, 2016) (approving a disclosure only settlement just a month after In re Trulia was decid-
ed); Gordon, 46 N.Y.S.3d at 565 (approving a disclosure only settlement under a different level of 
heightened scrutiny); In re Krispy Kreme, 2018 WL 264537, at *5–6 (approving a disclosure only 
settlement by applying the plainly material standard). 
 101 See In re Krispy Kreme, 2018 WL 264537, at *5–6 (including a discussion of In re Trulia, a 
formal adoption of the plainly material standard it established, and the approval of a disclosure only 
settlement under the heightened standard of scrutiny). 
 102 Id. 
 103 See id. (approving a disclosure only settlement while applying the plainly material standard 
established by In re Trulia). 
 104 See id. at *7–8 (discussing in detail what the additional disclosures contained). The court fur-
ther broke down the additional disclosures by classifying them into four main groups: 1) information 
about the cash flows used by the financial advisor to value the company; 2) plans for future employ-
ment opportunities after the merger; 3) any potential conflicts of interest that the financial advisors 
may have; and 4) what standards and figures the company used to compare itself to similar compa-
nies. Id. The court reasoned that these additional disclosures were “sufficiently material” and ap-
proved the settlement. See id. at *8 (approving a settlement based on the additional disclosures made). 
 105 In re BTU, 2016 WL 680252, at *2–3. The author of this opinion is Chancellor Bouchard, who 
wrote the opinion for In re Trulia. See id. at *4 (indicating Chancellor Bouchard’s signature on the 
opinion); see also In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 886 (indicating Chancellor Bouchard as the issuer of the 
opinion). In re Trulia was decided in January of 2016 and In re BTU was decided in February 2016, 
meaning it is likely that Chancellor Bouchard had the plainly material standard in his mind when 
deciding the case, despite not explicitly mentioning it anywhere in this opinion. See In re BTU, 2016 
WL 680252, at *2–3 (approving a disclosure only settlement without ever mentioning the plainly 
material standard); In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 889 (establishing the plainly material standard that is to 
be used to evaluate future disclosure only settlements). 
 106 See Verified Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 1–3, In re BTU, 2016 WL 
680252 (No. 72939522) (discussing the plaintiffs’ cause of action against the defendant corporation). 
The merger in question was between two companies that supplied manufacturing products. Id. 
 107 See In re Krispy Kreme, 2018 WL 264537, at *5–6 (approving a disclosure only settlement 
post In re Trulia); In re BTU, 2016 WL 680252, at *2–3 (approving a disclosure only settlement in 
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The court in In re Trulia was wary of the possibility that other jurisdic-
tions might not adopt this standard and would continue to freely approve dis-
closure only settlements.108 Some scholars believe that these lawsuits may start 
to migrate towards New York in the wake of a number of favorable deci-
sions.109 Various court decisions post In re Trulia seem to indicate that New 
York views disclosure only settlements more favorably than Delaware.110 New 
York uses a slightly different test when it considers approval of settlements, 
resulting in frequent approval of disclosure only settlements.111 In Gordon v. 
Verizon, a New York court approved a disclosure only settlement and explicitly 
questioned the hypothesis that states would follow Delaware in treating such 
settlements unfavorably.112 City Trading Fund v. Nye, a case decided by the 
Supreme Court of New York in 2018, discussed disclosure only settlements in 
even greater detail.113 In that case, the court implied that the standard estab-
lished in Gordon was easier to meet than the plainly material standard from In 
                                                                                                                           
Delaware, post In re Trulia, without discussing the plainly material standard); In re Trulia, 129 A.3d 
at 898 (containing strong language expressing the court’s negative view of disclosure only settle-
ments); Gordon, 46 N.Y.S.3d at 565 (approving a disclosure only settlement while applying a similar 
standard to the plainly material one established in In re Trulia). 
 108 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 899 (discussing the possibility that other courts and jurisdictions may 
not adopt this heightened level of scrutiny for disclosure only settlements). 
 109 See Gordon, 46 N.Y.S.3d at 565 (approving a disclosure only settlement while discussing In 
re Trulia and the possibility impacts of it on New York); City Trading Fund v. Nye, 72 N.Y.S.3d 371, 
371 (Sup. Ct. 2018) (noting that New York’s standard for approving judicial settlements is less strict 
than Delaware’s plainly material standard); Barkasy & Pereira, supra note 93, at *1 (discussing the 
possibility that these suits will move to New York as plaintiffs’ attorneys seek to find a forum that 
will provide a more favorable outcome, namely the approval of disclosure only settlements). 
 110 See Gordon, 46 N.Y.S.3d at 565 (discussing In re Trulia specifically before approving a dis-
closure only settlement under a different heightened level of scrutiny); City Trading Fund, 72 
N.Y.S.3d at 378–79 (comparing Gordon to In re Trulia and noting that the New York standard is 
easier to meet). 
 111 See Gordon, 46 N.Y.S.3d at 565 (adding two factors to the traditional five factor test in New 
York for evaluating a settlement). The original five factors that New York applied included: 1) the 
likelihood of success; 2) the extent of support from the parties; 3) the judgment of counsel; 4) the 
presence of bargaining in good faith; and 5) the nature of the issues of law and fact. See Barkasy & 
Pereira, supra note 93, at *3 (discussing the factors New York previously used to evaluate proposed 
stockholder class action settlements). The two factors added by Gordon are: 1) is the settlement in the 
best interest of the whole class; and 2) is it in the best interest of the defendant corporation. Id. 
 112 See Barkasy & Pereira, supra note 93, at *1, *3 (providing a discussion of how a jurisdiction 
other than Delaware might view disclosure only settlements more favorably in the future). 
 113 See City Trading Fund, 72 N.Y.S.3d at 371, 378–79 (expanding on Gordon and discussing in 
greater detail the future of disclosure only settlements). The court in City Trading Fund ultimately did 
not end up approving the disclosure only settlement on the grounds that the supplemental disclosures 
were “worthless.” See id. at 391–92 (comparing the disclosures made in several cases to the ones 
made in this one, while noting that the disclosures here mean nothing to plaintiffs). While, like In re 
Trulia, this case resulted in the denial of a disclosure only settlement, it is clear that New York is 
evaluating these settlements by a lesser level of scrutiny. See id. at 374 (noting that New York’s 
standard is “more lenient” than Delaware’s). 
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re Trulia.114 It is thus important to recognize that disclosure only settlements 
are not rendered useless as a tool in the process of settling litigation, as some 
jurisdictions have a more lenient standard in place for evaluating them.115 
B. The Mootness Dismissal Scenario and How It Compares  
to a Typical Disclosure Only Settlement 
The court in In re Trulia discussed an alternative scenario in which plain-
tiffs and defendants could avoid the stricter plainly material standard altogeth-
er.116 The court referred to this solution as a mootness dismissal scenario.117 In 
this scenario, upon the filing of a lawsuit, defendants respond by voluntarily 
providing additional disclosures to provide the information the plaintiffs are 
seeking.118 As a result, some of the plaintiffs’ claims are mooted.119 In order to 
avoid the plainly material standard, plaintiffs and defendants agree to stipula-
tions that accompany the request for attorney’s fees to dismiss the claims with-
out prejudice.120 Because the release of claims only binds the named plaintiff, 
defendants do not obtain a broad release of claims in this scenario, and the 
plainly material standard does not apply.121 The plaintiffs’ attorneys receive the 
fees they are seeking without having to survive the heightened level of scrutiny 
required by the plainly material standard.122 The defendants are willing to 
agree to these settlements because, according to the court, the statement of 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See id. at 381 (stating that the New York standard “requires a lesser showing” than In re 
Trulia, as the New York standard does not require that all doubt as to the materiality of the disclosures 
be removed). 
 115 See In re Krispy Kreme, 2018 WL 264537, at *5–6 (approving a disclosure only settlement 
post In re Trulia); In re BTU, 2016 WL 680252, at *2 (approving a disclosure only settlement in Del-
aware, post In re Trulia, without discussing the plainly material standard); Gordon, 46 N.Y.S.3d at 
565 (approving a disclosure only settlement while applying a similar standard to the plainly material 
one established in In re Trulia). 
 116 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 896–97 (discussing two possible routes for plaintiffs and defend-
ants to take in order to avoid the heightened level of scrutiny for which the plainly material standard 
calls). For the purposes of this Note, only the mootness dismissal route will be discussed further. See 
infra notes 117–139 and accompanying text. The other scenario involves a preliminary injunction 
motion and is not the focus of this Note, as it does not appear to be a route that attorneys are taking. 
See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 896–97 (discussing the two possible routes attorneys could take but 
noting that the mootness dismissal route seems to be much more prevalent). 
 117 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 896–97. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 897. The Supreme Court has explained that “dismissal without prejudice” means a plain-
tiff is not prohibited from returning to court at a later date with the same underlying claim made in the 
case that was dismissed without prejudice. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 
497, 505–06 (2001) (explaining the primary definition of dismissal without prejudice). 
 121 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 897. 
 122 Id. 
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dismissal without prejudice effectively marks an end to litigation about the 
issues regarding the proposed merger.123 
The key difference between a traditional disclosure only settlement and 
the mootness dismissal scenario lies in the release obtained.124 In a traditional 
disclosure only settlement, the defendants obtain a broad release of claims 
from the plaintiffs that precludes the class from later filing a lawsuit based on 
the same issues.125 As a result, the defendants have no motivation to fight the 
settlement or argue for appropriate attorney’s fees because the release they ob-
tain is worth much more.126 On the other hand, in a mootness dismissal scenar-
io only the named plaintiff in the class releases the defendant from liability.127 
Because the defendants no longer have a broad release of claims at stake, they 
are more willing to advocate for appropriate attorney’s fees because it is in 
their best interest to minimize the amount they would have to pay.128 
In re Family Dollar Stores, Inc. Stockholder Litigation involved a plain-
tiff that filed a class action challenging the proposed merger between Family 
Dollar and Dollar Tree, Inc.129 The plaintiff alleged several claims of breach of 
fiduciary duty, most notable being a failure to provide enough information to 
stockholders ahead of the merger.130 The defendant subsequently made addi-
tional disclosures that were available to the stockholders through its SEC fil-
ings.131 The plaintiff and defendant then agreed to dismiss the case without 
prejudice to the class because any claims that were likely to be successful were 
mooted by the supplemental disclosures.132 The court approved this mootness 
dismissal and then invited the parties to file briefs requesting appropriate attor-
ney’s fees.133 As a result of the plainly material standard being circumvented, 
the defendant received the benefit of the merger being completed without fur-
                                                                                                                           
 123 See id. at 897–98 (stating clearly that a dismissal is likely to be the end of the litigation over a 
particular transaction). 
 124 See In re Krispy Kreme, 2018 WL 264537, at *5 (providing insight into the mootness dismis-
sal scenario discussed in In re Trulia). 
 125 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 889–90 (discussing the release that the plaintiffs and defendant 
had agreed to and submitted to the court for approval). 
 126 See In re Krispy Kreme, 2018 WL 264537, at *5 (stating that when a defendant obtains this 
broad release, it “no longer has an incentive” to fight the proposed settlement). 
 127 See id. (explaining the difference between the mootness fee dismissal scenario and a tradition-
al disclosure only settlement). 
 128 See id. (stating that defendants in the mootness dismissal scenario have the ability to challenge 
the amount of attorney’s fees while maintaining the settlement). 
 129 See In re Family Dollar Stores, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 9985-CB, 2015 WL 
4642210, at *1–3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2015) (ordering the claims be dismissed without prejudice with 
respect to the class of plaintiffs). 
 130 Id. 
 131 See id. at *1–2 (noting the specific forms that the Defendant supplemented with the SEC). 
 132 Id. at *3. 
 133 See id. (inviting the plaintiff to submit a request for attorney’s fees and the Defendant to sub-
mit any opposition to such request). 
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ther impediment, and the plaintiffs’ attorneys received appropriate attorney’s 
fees.134 
From the court’s perspective, the alternative outcome suggested by In re 
Trulia and illustrated by In re Family Dollar Stores is preferable for several 
reasons.135 First, the dismissal without prejudice towards the class does not 
provide a broad release for defendants, meaning that a different plaintiff is not 
prohibited from challenging the proposed merger as a matter of law.136 This is 
beneficial because it ensures that future plaintiffs do not have their access to 
justice cut-off.137 Second, the adversarial nature of the litigation process is pre-
served when the dismissal is without prejudice.138 Finally, because defendants 
can still be sued regarding the proposed merger in question, they have the mo-
tivation to argue their case effectively in order to reduce attorney’s fees.139 
                                                                                                                           
 134 See In re Family Dollar Stores, 2015 WL 4642210, at *3 (explaining that the merger was 
allowed to proceed, and that the plaintiff was permitted to request attorney’s fees). Notably, discus-
sion of the plainly material standard or close examination the disclosures never arises in this dispute 
due to the mootness dismal approach. See id. (inviting the plaintiff to submit a request for attorney’s 
fees and the defendant to submit any opposition to such request). The mootness dismissal scenario is 
not as good of a deal for defendants, as there is no guarantee that plaintiffs will never bring a similar 
lawsuit at a later date. See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898 (discussing the mootness dismissal scenario); 
In re Riverbed, 2015 WL 5458041, at *4 (discussing the “broad release from liability” typically ob-
tained by a defendant as a result of a disclosure only settlement). 
 135 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 897 (referring to mootness dismissal as the favored scenario 
when dealing with disclosure only settlements). 
 136 See id. at 897–98 (discussing implicitly res judicata/collateral estoppel). The term res judicata 
translates directly to “a thing adjudicated.” Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
This doctrine precludes the same parties to a lawsuit that reached a final decision on the merits from 
litigating the same claim again. See id. (barring a party to a lawsuit from re-litigating a claim that was 
already litigated and decided). Similarly, the term collateral estoppel prevents the parties to a lawsuit 
that was actually litigated from subsequently litigating a new claim based on the same facts. See Col-
lateral Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (indicating that even if the second ac-
tion a party is attempting to bring is different from the first one decided, it will be barred because it is 
based on an issue that was previously litigated and decided). 
 137 See In re Krispy Kreme, 2018 WL 264537, at *5 (highlighting that only the named plaintiff 
releases the defendant of claims, implicitly reasoning that this is more acceptable than an entire class 
releasing its claims). 
 138 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 897 (noting that “the adversarial process would remain in place” 
in the mootness dismissal scenario because defendants that are no longer concerned with obtaining a 
broad release of claims have sufficient motivation to contest outlandish attorney’s fees). In the moot-
ness dismissal scenario, the release the defendants obtain is only from the named plaintiff, meaning 
another member of the class can sue them in the future. See In re Krispy Kreme, 2018 WL 264537, at 
*5 (stating that in the mootness dismissal scenario only the named plaintiff releases the defendant of 
any claims). 
 139 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 897 (discussing that in the mootness dismissal scenario, there is 
still an incentive for defendants to argue against the attorney’s fees associated with a proposed settle-
ment, which preserves the adversarial aspect that is crucial to these lawsuits). 
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III. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATES AND PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEYS 
It is well established that there is competition among the states to be the 
hub of incorporation.140 Delaware is widely recognized as the forerunner of 
this competition, as the state with the most corporate filings.141 More recently, 
scholars have focused on state competition regarding corporate litigation, pri-
marily as a means of maintaining corporate charters, and thus keeping revenue 
generating businesses in state.142 Specifically, these scholars tend to focus on 
merger litigation, as it is the most common form of corporate litigation.143 
There is empirical data that suggests attorney’s fees and the dismissal rates of 
lawsuits affect the number of lawsuits that are filed within a given state.144 
These numbers support the claim that states can impact the amount of litiga-
tion they receive and that states are responsive to declining litigation rates in 
an effort retain lawsuits.145 
The typical form of merger litigation is the class action lawsuit, and the 
main proponents behind it are the stockholder plaintiffs’ attorney’s firms.146 A 
study out of Columbia Law School argues that plaintiffs’ attorneys in corporate 
litigation see a successful business opportunity in filing class action law-
suits.147 The study further contends that these attorneys are motivated not by 
the possibility of obtaining a positive outcome for their clients, but rather by 
the “collusive settlements” that provide a financial benefit of attorney’s fees 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 471–72 (discussing the commonly accepted principle 
that there is state competition for initial public offering filings); Daines, supra note 13, at 1566, 1572 
(providing numerical data to show that Delaware is dominating the competition between states for 
corporation filings). The main motivation behind this state competition is that corporate filings are a 
large source of tax revenue for states. See Cary, supra note 28, at 664–65, 668–69 (describing how 
Delaware initially changed its law to attract the revenue associated with corporations). The General 
Assembly of Delaware has even declared it a formal public policy of the state to remain attractive to 
corporations in order to maintain the primary revenue generator that is the corporate business. See id. 
at 663 (explaining that Delaware’s efforts to maintain the corporate business are rooted in the desire to 
maintain the revenue associated with it). 
 141 See Daines, supra note 13, at 1566, 1572 & tbl.3 (showing that from 1995 to 1998, around 
50% of Fortune 500 companies and 77% of companies making an initial public offering were filed in 
Delaware). 
 142 See Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 471–72 (discussing broadly the possible motivations 
states have for competing for corporate litigation). 
 143 See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: 
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 131, 135 (2004) (discussing how litigation 
challenging mergers has surpassed derivative actions as the most prominent form of corporate litiga-
tion). 
 144 Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 483 & tbl.V.A. 
 145 See id. at 497–98 (discussing that the broad results of the statistical analysis conducted shows 
that there is state competition for litigation). 
 146 Id. at 480; Thompson & Thomas, supra note 143, at 135. 
 147 See Coffee, supra note 50, at 677 (explaining that a potential cause of non-meritorious litiga-
tion may be the plaintiffs’ attorney’s need to maintain a business). 
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for themselves.148 Other professors have supported this argument through sub-
sequent studies.149 The consensus among scholars is that obtaining attorney’s 
fees is what drives the pervasiveness of stockholder litigation, not the desire of 
obtaining a benefit or relief for the stockholders.150 
Armed with the knowledge of what motivates merger litigation broadly, 
scholars have sought to understand what factors influence where these lawsuits 
are filed.151 One study suggests that the two main factors influencing plaintiffs’ 
forum selection are attorney’s fees and lawsuit dismissal rate.152 The logic be-
hind attorney’s fees as a motivating factor is fairly straightforward.153 Plain-
tiffs’ attorneys will choose to file suit in a forum that offers higher attorney’s 
fees.154 The logic behind lawsuit dismissal rate as a factor is slightly more 
complicated.155 
                                                                                                                           
 148 See id. (discussing possible causes for frivolous lawsuits). Coffee implies that these lawsuits 
are frivolous in nature and are only motivated by the plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking attorney’s fees. See 
id. (discussing the financial motivations that plaintiffs’ attorneys have in filing class action lawsuits). 
Scholars have written on attorney’s fees in other contexts, including shareholder litigation. See gener-
ally Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the 
Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2015) (discussing the problematic relationship between fee-
shifting and shareholding litigation). 
 149 See Weiss & White, supra note 50, 1851–52, 1855–56 (explaining that the primary motive 
behind class action litigation is to obtain settlement and subsequent attorney’s fees). 
 150 See id. (explaining that the primary motive behind class action litigation is to obtain settlement 
and subsequent attorney’s fees). These scholars conducted a study comparing cases litigated by law-
yers with “real clients” to those with more “traditional clients.” Id. at 1841–42. The scholars use the 
term “real clients” to refer to those who have a substantial financial interest in the outcome of the 
lawsuit, and the term “traditional clients” to refer to the more common class action phenomenon, 
whereby the client is more of a namesake and the plaintiffs’ attorneys are the ones truly litigating the 
case. See id. (highlighting the difference between “real clients” and “traditional clients” for the pur-
poses of this study). The scholars hypothesized that if there was no difference in how the cases were 
litigated between “real clients” and “traditional clients,” then it would not be an attorney driven pro-
cess. See id. (describing attorneys in such situations as “faithful champions”). Ultimately, the scholars 
found that those cases with “real clients” were litigated much differently from those with “traditional 
clients.” See id. (highlighting the differences between the types of cases studied). For example, cases 
with “real clients” had complaints that were much more detailed and filed several days after the an-
nouncement of a merger. Id. On the other hand, cases with “traditional clients” had complaints that 
were described as “bare bones” and that were filed only one to two days after the announcement of a 
merger. Id. at 1842. As a result, the scholars concluded that the vast majority of class action lawsuits 
challenging a merger are driven by the plaintiffs’ attorneys and not by the individual plaintiffs. See id. 
at 1855–56 (concluding that lawsuits filed in Delaware challenging mergers are primarily motivated 
by plaintiffs’ attorneys and not by the actual plaintiffs). 
 151 See Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 469 (explaining the purpose of the study is to test the 
hypothesis that states compete for litigation by altering attorney’s fees and the rate at which they dis-
miss lawsuits). 
 152 See id. (discussing that the rates at which a jurisdiction dismisses cases and the amount of 
attorney’s fees it awards are factors that impact where lawsuits are filed). 
 153 See id. at 496–97 (explaining the general idea that plaintiffs’ attorneys are motivated by the 
possibility of receiving attorney’s fees). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
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Because merger litigation nearly always comes in the form of a class ac-
tion, judicial approval of the settlement is required in order for attorney’s fees 
to be awarded.156 Therefore, plaintiffs’ attorneys are more likely to file a mer-
ger litigation lawsuit in a forum that has a lower lawsuit dismissal rate, be-
cause that gives them a greater chance of obtaining attorney’s fees.157 Turning 
from the logic behind these factors towards supporting statistics is helpful to 
illustrate these points.158 
A study conducted on merger litigation between 2005 and 2011 provides 
data to support the theory discussed above.159 Over this time period, Delaware 
received almost thirty percent of the merger litigation filed.160 Its two closest 
competitors were California and New York, which together received about twen-
ty percent of merger lawsuits.161 The mean and median fees were higher in Del-
aware than in both California and New York.162 This suggests, at a bare mini-
mum, that there is a correlation between the amount of attorney’s fees awarded 
in a particular jurisdiction and the number of lawsuits filed there.163 Further, 
there is evidence to show that if a jurisdiction decreases attorney’s fees, plain-
tiffs’ attorneys will file future lawsuits in states that give higher awards.164 
The study goes on to examine whether or not states react to this shifting 
in forum by plaintiffs’ firms.165 Ultimately, it finds that states will often in-
crease the amount of attorney’s fees they award or decrease the number of law-
                                                                                                                           
 156 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (governing rule on class actions in federal law); Krishnan et al., supra 
note 26, at 133 (noting that nearly 86% of M&A lawsuits are class actions). If a court is more likely to 
dismiss a case, then it is less likely to award attorney’s fees. See Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 
496–97 (discussing how Delaware reacts to a loss on litigation to explain the two factors). 
 157 See Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 496–97 (showing that plaintiffs’ attorneys file lawsuits 
in jurisdictions with lower dismissal rates). 
 158 See id. at 469 (discussing the two factors that the authors hypothesize influence forum selec-
tion are attorney’s fees and dismissal rates). 
 159 See id. at 481–82, 481 tbl.IV.A (displaying the results from the scholars data analysis in a 
table). 
 160 Id. at 482 & tbl.IV.B. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 482–83, 482 tbl.IV.B (including a graph to compare 
different venues and their mean and median amount of attorney’s fees). 
 163 See id. (providing visual aids to document information regarding attorney’s fees). The study 
acknowledges that there are other possible causes for these numbers. Id. at 497. It discusses the possi-
bility that plaintiffs might prefer to file in Delaware for reasons other than the size of its attorney’s 
fees and low dismissal rate. Id. One major reason posited is that plaintiffs might view Delaware as the 
jurisdiction with the best chance of success for the lawsuit. Id. The study also acknowledges that 
states may compete for litigation for a variety of different reasons, and it might not be because they 
want to receive more lawsuits. See id. (reasoning implicitly that correlation is not causation and that 
their findings should be understood through this lens). Some states might compete for litigation as a 
means for obtaining corporate charters. Id. 
 164 See id. at 496 (explaining more broadly the implications of the study). 
 165 See id. at 496–97 (discussing that states react to plaintiffs filing lawsuits elsewhere by either 
raising the amount of attorney’s fees they award or decreasing the rate at which they dismiss lawsuits, 
therefore making it more likely that the plaintiffs’ attorneys receive their fees). 
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suits they dismiss in an effort to maintain or increase the litigation they re-
ceive.166 Interestingly, the study found that Delaware generally does not seek 
to improve its chances of obtaining merger litigation through increasing attor-
ney’s fees, but rather focuses on lowering its dismissal rate—a more effective 
way of impacting the rate of litigation.167 
A second study included similar data from the years 2012 and 2013.168 
The study found that the share of litigation that Delaware received decreased 
slightly from 2012 to 2013.169 The study went on to conclude that during this 
time, Delaware allowed the same percentage of cases to settle, while slightly 
decreasing the mean and median amount of attorney’s fees awarded.170 This is 
beneficial to plaintiffs’ attorneys who are motivated by the favorable outcome 
of settlement, which leads to attorney’s fees.171 There is evidence to suggest 
that when Delaware experiences a lag in merger litigation, it seeks to decrease 
its dismissal rate of lawsuits in order to be more attractive to plaintiffs’ attor-
neys seeking to obtain attorney’s fees through settlement.172 Overall, when 
there is a lower chance that a lawsuit is dismissed, there is a greater chance 
that attorney’s fees will be awarded to plaintiffs’ attorneys.173 
IV. DELAWARE AS A CREATURE OF HABIT: A RECENT TREND TOWARD THE 
MOOTNESS DISMISSAL SCENARIO 
Because Delaware has previously responded to a loss of merger litigation 
by lowering its dismissal rate of lawsuits in an effort to influence the forum 
selection of plaintiffs’ attorneys, this Note posits that it will act similarly in the 
wake of In re Trulia.174 In re Trulia is too recent of a case for an empirical 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See id. (explaining possible state reactions to losing litigation). 
 167 See id. (discussing various responses states have previously made when they experience de-
clining litigation). 
 168 See Cain & Solomon, supra note 1, at 5–6 (continuing their study from Cain & Solomon, 
supra note 13, and looking at data from 2012 and 2013). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. From 2012 to 2013, the percentage of applicable cases in Delaware that settled remained at 
72.7%. Id. at 5. In contrast, the mean attorney’s fees awarded dropped from $650,000 to $450,000, 
while the median dropped from $500,000 to $450,000. Id. at 2 tbl.C. 
 171 See Coffee, supra note 50, at 677 (explaining that a potential cause of non-meritorious litiga-
tion may be the plaintiffs’ attorney’s need to maintain a business); Weiss & White, supra note 50, at 
1851–52, 1855–56 (explaining that the primary motive behind class action litigation is to obtain set-
tlement and subsequent attorney’s fees). 
 172 See Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 496–97 (discussing Delaware’s specific reaction to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys forum shopping). The study indicated that lowering the dismissal rate of lawsuits 
had a greater impact on plaintiffs’ attorneys forum selection than awarding a greater amount in attor-
ney’s fees. Id. at 497. 
 173 See id. at 496–97 (operating under the unstated assumption that attorney’s fees cannot be 
awarded in a case that is dismissed). 
 174 See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 887–8 (Del. Ch. 2016) (discussing the 
proposed disclosure only settlement for the merger); Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 496–97 (dis-
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study indicating whether or not there has been an increase or decrease in the 
lawsuits filed in Delaware.175 Anecdotally, it seems that plaintiffs’ attorneys are 
looking elsewhere in an effort to obtain a more favorable outcome.176 There 
has been at least one case filed in New York after In re Trulia, which resulted 
in the approval of a disclosure only settlement.177 This suggests that the plain-
tiffs’ attorneys were successful in obtaining a more favorable outcome by filing 
suit in a forum other than Delaware.178 
Assuming that Delaware is losing litigation business as a result of In re 
Trulia, it follows that it will attempt to mitigate this loss and retain merger liti-
gation.179 Its previous method of solving this problem involved decreasing its 
dismissal rates of lawsuits in order to increase settlement rates, to stimulate 
outcomes that resulted in plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees.180 The problem with In re 
Trulia is that the issue does not stem from dismissal of a lawsuit, but rather the 
fact that it is a denial of the settlement that plaintiffs’ attorneys sought.181 
This slightly different problem facing Delaware requires a new solu-
tion.182 In re Trulia makes it more challenging for disclosure only settlements 
to be approved, which in turn makes it more difficult for attorney’s fees to be 
awarded.183 Since Delaware cannot stop the loss of merger litigation caused by 
In re Trulia by decreasing its dismissal rate, it could seek to walk back its hold-
                                                                                                                           
cussing that states react to plaintiffs filing lawsuits elsewhere by either raising the amount of attor-
ney’s fees they award or decreasing their dismissal rates). 
 175 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d (deciding this case in 2016). 
 176 See Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 557, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (mentioning 
In re Trulia while going on to approve a disclosure only settlement, implying that there is a more 
favorable view of disclosure only settlements in New York). Verizon is incorporated in Delaware, yet 
chose in this settlement agreement to include a clause establishing that the laws of New York would 
govern the terms, implying that Verizon felt that New York would view the terms of the settlement 
more favorably than Delaware. See id. at 566 (describing the choice-of-law clause included in the 
settlement). In Gordon, the court evaluated a proposed disclosure only settlement in response to a 
lawsuit challenging Verizon Wireless’s acquisition of Vodafone Group PLC. Id. at 561–62. The court 
ended up applying what it called an “enhanced standard” to the disclosure only settlement. See id. at 
566–68 (discussing the need to apply the original five factor test as well as an additional two factors 
established in Gordon to evaluating proposed class action settlements). The court ultimately approved 
the disclosure only settlement under its enhanced scrutiny. Id. at 572–73. 
 177 See id. at 570–72 (explaining New York’s stance on disclosure only settlements in light of In 
re Trulia). 
 178 See id. (discussing In re Trulia and how New York will treat disclosure only settlements). 
 179 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 899 (expressing concerns about plaintiffs engaging in forum 
shopping as a result of this decision); Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 496–97 (discussing how 
Delaware responds to a loss of litigation by decreasing its dismissal rate). 
 180 See Cain & Solomon, supra note 13, at 496–97. 
 181 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 899 (discussing the possibility of forum shopping, implying that 
the plainly material standard is likely to result in the plaintiffs’ attorneys not receiving the settlements 
for which they are looking). 
 182 See id. (discussing disclosure only settlements and the problems they create). 
 183 See id. (explaining the interaction between disclosure only settlements and attorney’s fees). 
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ing in the case.184 This might be difficult because the court in In re Trulia used 
fairly strong language about disclosure only settlements and made it clear that 
these settlements will be viewed less favorably.185 As it is unlikely that the 
court can overcome the clear distaste for disclosure only settlements it showed 
in In re Trulia, another method for obtaining the plaintiffs’ attorney’s desired 
outcome must be utilized.186 
This other method might well be the mootness dismissal scenario that was 
discussed at some length by the court in In re Trulia.187 In its opinion, the court 
noted that even prior to In re Trulia, there seemed to be a shift towards this 
route by plaintiffs and defendants.188 Since In re Trulia, there have been cases 
where parties have chosen this mootness dismissal route.189 In In re Xoom 
Corp. Stockholder Litigation, plaintiffs and defendants agreed to a mootness 
dismissal stipulation as a result of supplemental disclosures that were made.190 
The court mentioned In re Trulia specifically and noted that the plainly materi-
al standard does not apply in the mootness dismissal scenario.191 Instead, plain-
tiffs are entitled to receive attorney’s fees if the supplemental disclosures pro-
vided any benefit to the stockholders.192 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See id. (including strong language indicating Delaware’s skepticism towards disclosure only 
settlements). 
 185 See id. at 898–99 (calling disclosure only settlements the “suboptimal path” and declaring that 
courts going forward will have heightened awareness in their evaluation of these settlements). By its 
nature, an established precedent is difficult to overturn, particularly a precedent that was so recently 
established with such clear language. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (not-
ing that stare decisis carries so much weight that in order to break an established precedent, there 
needs to be a unique reason). 
 186 See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898–99 (discussing two alternative routes for plaintiffs and de-
fendants to take in order to avoid the heightened level of scrutiny for which the plainly material stand-
ard calls). 
 187 See id. at 896–97 (discussing the two possible routes attorneys could take but noting that the 
mootness dismissal route seems to be much more prevalent). 
 188 See id. at 897 (noting that the mootness dismissal scenario is gaining traction). 
 189 See In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., Civil Action No. 11263–VCG, 2016 WL 4146425, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016) (describing a mootness dismissal scenario, post In re Trulia); La. Mun. 
Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Black, C.A. No. 9410-VCN, 2016 WL 790898, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 
2016) (discussing a mootness dismissal scenario, post In re Trulia). 
 190 See In re Xoom, 2016 WL 4146425, at *3 (explaining that the mootness dismissal scenario 
requires a different analysis than the a traditional disclosure only settlement that includes a broad 
release of claims). 
 191 See id. (comparing the mootness dismissal scenario with traditional disclosure only settle-
ments). 
 192 See id. (explaining the differences between the mootness dismissal scenario and the more 
traditional disclosure only settlements). This seems to harken back to the precedent prior to In re 
Trulia, under which even a meager benefit to plaintiffs warranted approval of a disclosure only set-
tlement. See In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 5458041, 
at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (approving a disclosure only settlement even when the disclosures 
were of little or no importance to stockholders); In re Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Cos, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
Civil Action No. 13109, 1996 WL 74214, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 1996) (approving a disclosure only 
settlement that only had a meager benefit to stockholders). 
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The mootness dismissal scenario has also been discussed to some extent by 
New York courts.193 In City Trading Fund, the court notes that the lesser stand-
ard established by Gordon seems to mirror the mootness dismissal standard from 
Delaware.194 This lesser standard is explained as one requiring that additional 
disclosures be helpful to plaintiff stockholders.195 As New York seems to be 
adopting this lesser standard for its evaluation of disclosure only settlements, it is 
likely that plaintiffs’ attorneys will file suit in New York, as it is the jurisdiction 
that is more likely to grant the attorney’s fees they are seeking.196 
Based on a recent trend towards the mootness dismissal scenario by plain-
tiffs, defendants, and the Delaware courts, it seems likely that Delaware will 
further rely on this approach going forward.197 The dismissal of a suit without 
prejudice is a successful way for plaintiffs’ attorneys to both avoid the plainly 
material standard and to obtain the favorable outcome of attorney’s fees.198 In 
re Trulia explains that defendants are effectively in the same position as ob-
taining a broad release of claims because a dismissal without prejudice often 
means that the issues brought by plaintiffs will not be brought in future law-
suits.199 Thus, Delaware will likely attempt to compete for merger litigation by 
continuing to advocate for mootness dismissal orders by awarding attorney’s 
fees in such cases it receives.200 
The uncertainty lies in what future plaintiffs and defendants are likely to 
do.201 Plaintiffs may engage in forum shopping to find a venue that will approve 
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the traditional disclosure only settlement, which would mean that more cases 
could make their way to places like New York.202 Alternatively, they may hear 
Delaware’s not so quiet pleading and answer by following the mootness dismis-
sal scenario to obtain attorney’s fees and continue to file lawsuits in Delaware.203 
Regardless, the relationship between state competition for litigation and disclo-
sure only settlements will continue to evolve over time, as dictated by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys ever so constant motivation of achieving attorney’s fees.204 
CONCLUSION 
For some time, scholars have recognized that states participate in a com-
petition in order to obtain a favorable share of the nation’s corporate litigation. 
States accomplish this by either raising attorney’s fees or decreasing the dis-
missal rates of lawsuits. Additionally, plaintiffs’ attorneys are primarily moti-
vated by the opportunity to collect attorney’s fees from the settlement of a 
class action. Although Delaware is widely considered the leading state when it 
comes to matters of corporate law, it is not immune from the need to compete 
to maintain its status. In the past, whenever Delaware has lost some of its pri-
macy, it has responded by decreasing the rate at which it dismisses lawsuits in 
an effort to entice plaintiffs’ attorneys to continue filing there. 
In re Trulia is a case that makes it less likely that plaintiffs’ attorneys will 
receive the attorney’s fees they are seeking, as it provides a more difficult 
standard to obtain approval of disclosure only settlements. As a result, there 
has been an emerging trend of corporate merger litigation being filed in other 
jurisdictions. The most likely result of this trend is that Delaware will begin to 
walk back its hard-lined stance from In re Trulia and approve more disclosure 
only settlements. This may be difficult, however, because of the firmness of 
the In re Trulia opinion. Thus, another solution that plaintiffs and defendants 
have recently taken is the mootness dismissal scenario discussed in In re 
Trulia. In this scenario, disclosures are made by agreement but the case is dis-
missed without prejudice. This route avoids the plainly material standard es-
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tablished in In re Trulia and makes it more likely that plaintiffs’ attorneys will 
receive the desired outcome of attorney’s fees that they seek. States are crea-
tures of habit, and when presented with a familiar situation, they will reach for 
a solution that is similar to one that has worked in the past. In the wake of In re 
Trulia and its treatment of disclosure only settlements, the new, yet similar so-
lution is the mootness dismissal scenario. What remains to be seen is whether 
plaintiffs’ attorneys will keep their litigation business in Delaware, or continue 
to test the waters of a seemingly friendlier jurisdiction, such as New York. 
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